Implicit contracts and the cyclicality of the skill-premium by Pourpourides, Panayiotis & Cardiff University
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cardiff Economics  
Working Papers 
Panayiotis M. Pourpourides 
Implicit Contracts and the Cyclicality of the Skill-Premium 
E2007/19 
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
This working paper is produced for discussion purpose only. These working papers are expected to be published in 
due course, in revised form, and should not be quoted or cited without the author’s written permission. 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers are available online from: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/econ/workingpapers 
Enquiries: EconWP@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
ISSN 1749-6101 
June 2007, Updated April 2010 
 
 
Cardiff Business School 
Cardiff University 
Colum Drive 
Cardiff CF10 3EU 
United Kingdom 
t: +44 (0)29 2087 4000 
f: +44 (0)29 2087 4419 
www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs 
Implicit Contracts and the Cyclicality of the
Skill-Premium
Panayiotis M. Pourpourides (Cardi¤ Business School)y
April 30, 2010
Abstract
To examine the cyclical behavior of the skill-premium, this paper introduces implicit
labor contracts in a DSGE model where production is characterized by capital-skill
complementarity and the utilization of capital is endogenous. It is shown that this
model can reproduce the observed cyclical patterns of wages and the skill-premium.
The feature of capital-skill complementarity coupled with variable capital utilization
rates does not come at odds with the acyclical behavior of the skill-premium. The
paper argues that the skill-complementarity of capital is not a quantitatively signicant
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a revival of interest in the behavior of the aggregate skill-premium,
or the relative wage of skilled (college) and unskilled (no college) workers, at low frequen-
cies. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000, hereafter Krusell et al.) nd that when
technology exhibits the feature of capital-skill complementarity, changes in capital and labor
inputs can account for nearly all the low frequency variation of the US skill-premium.1 De-
spite the success of Walrasian equilibrium models in explaining economic growth facts they
fail to account for the weak contemporaneous correlation between real wages and the busi-
ness cycle. This is due to the fact that Walrasian real wages respond only to the marginal
product of labor which is strongly positively correlated with the business cycle. Further-
more, in Walrasian markets, the coexistence of capital-skill complementarity and variable
capital utilization generates strongly procyclical skill-premia which are at odds with the
empirical ndings.2 This paper examines the extent to which the feature of capital-skill
complementarity is important in accounting for the cyclical behavior of the skill-premium
from the perspective of a real business cycle model with a non-Walrasian labor market. It
also examines the role of endogenous capital utilization and shows that the coexistence of
the latter and capital-skill complementarity can be reconciled with the acyclical behavior of
the skill-premium.
The paper introduces implicit labor contracts in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
1Capital-skill complementarity means that the elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and
unskilled labor is higher than that between capital equipment and skilled labor. Evidence of capital-skill
complementarity can also be found in previous studies. Hamermesh (1993) presents an extensive survey.
2With variable capital utilization and capital-skill complementarity present in the production process, the
marginal productivity of skilled labor responds much more to technology improvements than the marginal
productivity of unskilled labor because the response of the utilization of capital is strongly positive. Since
technology shocks are the dominant source of business cycle uctuations, a model which assumes a Walrasian
labor market (i.e real wages equal marginal labor productivities) generates a strongly procyclical skill-
premium which is at odds with the empirical ndings. This implication of the Walrasian model is problematic
because empirical evidence supports that both capital-skill complementarity and variable capital utilization
are present in the production processs. The importance of variable capital utilization is stressed, among
others, by Bils and Cho (1994), Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), Shapiro (1996), Basu and Kimball (1997)
and King and Rebelo (1999).
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(DSGE) model where production is characterized by capital-skill complementarity and the
utilization of capital is endogenous. The model economy is populated by risk averse workers
(skilled and unskilled) and less risk averse entrepreneurs that possess the capital stock of
the economy. Following Boldrin and Horvath (1995), I consider the existence of one-period
contracts that provide insurance against business cycle uctuations to workers of both skill-
types. The model is an otherwise standard neoclassical model where business cycles are
driven by two types of shocks, Harrod-neutral and investment-specic.
As long as the workers are substantially more risk averse than the entrepreneurs, the
Pareto optimal allocation implied by the model is quantitatively consistent with empirical
ndings on wages and the skill-premium while preserving basic business cycle properties of
macroeconomic aggregates.3 The quantitative analysis indicates that the feature of capital-
skill complementarity coupled with variable capital utilization rates does not come at odds
with the observed cyclical variation of the skill-premium. Capital-skill complementarity
has a signicant role at low frequencies due to the fact that the trend of real wages can
be well approximated by marginal productivities. The current study shows that short-run
uctuations of the skill-premium may not necessarily correspond only to uctuations of the
relative marginal productivity. The latter is consistent with the empirical ndings of Cooley
and Ogaki (1996). The relative wage uctuations in the model are substantially a¤ected by
the variation of an insurance component which is embodied in real wages.
The empirical analysis shows that the steady state level of wage inequality has a signi-
cant role in short-run dynamics. Sensitivity analysis demonstrates that changing the steady
state level of the skill-premium produces signicant changes in the cyclical behavior of the
latter. In particular, a higher level of wage inequality implies less procyclical (or even more
countercyclical) skill-premia. This is due to the fact that as unskilled labor becomes cheaper
than skilled labor, the rms have a bigger margin to increase relatively more the wages of
unskilled workers in response to a technology improvement. The role of variable capital uti-
3The contracts are Pareto optimal in terms of the expected utility. See footnote 16.
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lization is essential in the model because not only it magnies and propagates the e¤ects of
shocks in the economy but also a¤ects the responses of wages to the shocks in a way that the
mixture of responses generates an acyclical skill-premium. The analysis indicates that when
the utilization of capital is constant the wages and the skill-premium become considerably
procyclical and in sharp contrast with the empirical ndings.
Lindquist (2004) examines the cyclical behavior of the skill-premium by employing a
DSGE model. Specically, he nds the social planners solution to a DSGE model with
capital-skill complementarity in production and a xed capital utilization rate. He shows
that the model produces skill-premia which are uncorrelated with the business cycle and
that a model without capital-skill complementarity bares no resemblance to the data. In
either case, the model fails to replicate the observed cyclicality of real wages. The social
planning solution corresponds to a decentralized Walrasian equilibrium because the welfare
theorems hold. In Walrasian models however, wages always equal the marginal product of
labor and hence, are strongly correlated with output. Furthermore, Young (2003) shows
that if the utilization of capital is allowed to vary over the business cycle then, the feature
of capital-skill complementarity generates a strongly procyclical skill-premium. The latter
is attributable to the fact that the ratio of e¤ective capital to skilled labor becomes strongly
procyclical, dominating the e¤ect of relative labor supply. The current study addresses those
issues.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion
on implicit contracts and the cyclical behavior of real wages. Section 3 displays the model
economy and section 4 analyzes the model quantitatively. Concluding remarks are contained
in section 5.
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2 Implicit Contracts and Real Wages
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) show that when past market conditions are taken into con-
sideration, in a manner consistent with models of labor contracting, the data suggest that
real wages do not move systematically over the business cycle.4 Cooley and Ogaki (1996),
nd that the real wage equals marginal productivity only in the long run and that the time
series properties of real wages are better explained by an optimal labor contract model. Ham
and Reilly (2002), model the marginal product of labor as a function of observable demand
variables and nd that the implicit contracts model cannot be rejected by the data while the
Walrasian model is rejected in all the cases considered.5
Keane and Prasad (1993) were among the rst who studied the cyclicality of wage di¤er-
entials by classifying skilled and unskilled workers according to education. Their estimates
indicate that, at the aggregate level, skilled and unskilled workers face essentially the same
degree of cyclical variation in their wages. In other words, the wage premium paid to
skilled workers is found to be acyclical. This observation is conrmed by evidence provided
by Young (2003), Lindquist (2004) and Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) who conduct their
analyses using various aggregate measures of real wages.
The current study incorporates a mechanism of labor relations in which wages are de-
coupled from marginal productivity.6 Specically, the wage rate and hours of work are
4The acyclicality of various aggregate measures of real wages is documented in many studies (eg Lindquist
(2004) and Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008)).
5The implicit contracts theory has performed well in testing, even under the assumption that workers sim-
ply consume their labor earnings (eg Beaudry and DiNardo (1991, 1995) and Cooley and Ogaki (1996)). This
assumption is also made in the current paper. Although this restrictive assumption is made for tractability
it has ample empirical support. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) nd that the permanent income hypothesis
is not satised for about 50% of the population or, in other words, for about half the population consump-
tion equals labor earnings. Guvenen (2006) nds that households in the top 20% of the wealth distribution
hold about 90% of capital and land and virtually all nancial assets but account for only 30% of aggregate
consumption. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2005; b) report similar results. Finally,
several econometric studies estimate euler equations and nd less evidence of asset pricing anomalies when
only data on stockholders are employed (eg Aït-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2001), Attanasio, Banks and
Tanner (2002), Brav, Constantinides and Ceczy (2002) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)).
6An alternative approach is to use a model of search and matching frictions. In such model, the frictions
articulate an endogenous need for surplus sharing between workers and rms As Hall (2005) shows, any de-
sired level of decoupling of wages from marginal product can be achieved by employing various wage-setting
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determined prior to the realization of shocks via a perfectly enforceable labor contract. The
contract is implicit in the sense that it species a wage bill and labor hours for each possible
realization of a vector of shocks.7 The idea is based on the proposition that workers prefer
relatively smooth predictable patterns to their income and thereby, are willing to buy in-
surance against business cycle uctuations. Assuming that the workers are restricted from
accessing capital markets, the labor contract is the only insurance device available to them.
Consequently, wages are not only a function of productivity but also a function of an insur-
ance component which breaks the one-to-one relationship between the wage and the marginal
product of labor. The implication is that the insurance component prevents the wage from
declining sharply during recessions and increasing substantially during expansions.
Labor contracts of this nature were previously introduced in dynamic real business cycle
models by Horvath (1994) and Boldrin and Horvath (1995). Both papers assume that the
economy is populated by a single type of risk averse workers and relatively less risk averse
entrepreneurs. Horvath assumes that entrepreneurs simply organize production whereas
Boldrin and Horvath introduce entrepreneurial labor e¤ort. They allow for risk sharing
between workers and entrepreneurs which takes the form of a utility contract structured as a
state contingent wage and labor hours menu. Both show that the model with contracts not
only replicates all the features by which the standard real business cycle model is deemed to
t the data well but also replicates the behavior of real wages. Gomme and Greenwood (1995)
obtain similar results by introducing labor contracts in a slightly di¤erent way. First, the
contracts are not derived from an incentive compatibility constraint. Instead, they assume
that the real wage consists of two additively separable components, the marginal product of
labor and a mixture of state contingent claims via which workers and entrepreneurs share
mechanisms or even simply varying parameters of a given wage-setting mechanism (i.e, Nash bargaining).
Nevertheless, features such as workers of di¤erent skill types, capital-skill complementarity, various technol-
ogy shocks and endogenous capital utilization are considerably di¢ cult to model within a search/matching
framework. The results of the current study are particularly useful for such an extension.
7The theoretical background of implicit contracts originates in the work of Bailey (1974), Azariadis (1975,
1976) and Gordon (1974).
6
aggregate risk. Second, hours of work are not determined a priori by the contract but are
merely set to satisfy the models e¢ ciency conditions.8
3 The Benchmark Economy
Consider an economy where there are three types of innitely lived agents: the skilled, the
unskilled and the capitalists. The agents within each group are identical and in numbers
such that every agent perceives his inuence on aggregate quantities to be insignicant. The
capitalists own all the capital stock of the economy which consists of capital structures, Ks
and capital equipment, Ke. The workers are restricted from accessing capital markets so that
their current labor earnings equal their current consumption. Furthermore, there is a xed
number s of skilled workers and a xed number u of unskilled workers for each capitalist.
The capitalists, rst observe the realization of technology shocks, denoted by the vector
f 2 =, and then choose the level of output they produce, pay the workers, and retain the
residual output to be either consumed or invested in future capital stock. The capitalists
output at time t is denoted by Yt, and is given by the following four-factor constant returns
to scale production function:
Yt = e
AtF (Kst; UtKet; Lst; Lut) (1)
where At is a Harrod-neutral technology shock that follows a stationary Markov process, Lst
and Lut are total skilled and unskilled hours, respectively, Ut is the utilization rate of capital
equipment and F () is the following CES aggregator:
F (Kst; UtKet; Lst; Lut) = K

st
h
Lut + (1  ) [ (UtKet)' + (1  )L'st]

'
i 1 

8Danthine and Donaldson (1992) incorporate labor contracting in a real business cycle model that is
populated by young and old workers. The role of the contract is simply to guarantee full employment to all
old workers. The model is successful in replicating the observed volatility in hours.
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where  is the income share of capital structures. Parameters  and  determine the income
share of unskilled labor and the income share of capital equipment relative to skilled labor,
respectively. The elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor
is 1= (1  ) while the elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and skilled labor
is 1= (1  '). Whenever  > ', the production function is said to exhibit capital-skill
complementarity. Capital structures can be produced from nal output on one-to-one basis.
The stock of structures evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kst+1 = (1  s)Kst + Ist (2)
where Ist is investment in structures and s is the corresponding depreciation rate. The
accumulation equation for capital equipment is the following:
Ket+1 = (1  e (Ut))Ket + eZtIet (3)
where Iet is investment in equipment and Zt is an investment specic shock that follows a
stationary Markov process which is independent of that of At. Let the vector of technology
shocks be denoted by ft = [At; Zt]
0. Then, f follows a stationary Markov process summarized
by the transition function P (f; f 0) - where the prime,0, denotes next period.
The depreciation rate of capital equipment is assumed to change with the utilization rate
of capital and is dened as
e (Ut) = b
U1+!t
1 + !
(4)
where b > 0 and ! > 0.9 Installing new capital involves adjustment costs t = st + et,
where st is the cost for structures and et is the cost for equipment. These costs have the
9As noted by Greenwood et al. (2000), equipment, unlike structures, has variable rates of utilization and
depreciation because it has a more active role in production. There is also evidence that new technologies
are mainly embodied in capital equipment rather than in capital structures.
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following functional form:
i =
i
2
(Iit   iKit)2 for i = s, e (7)
where i > 0.
10 Notice that at the steady state adjustment costs are zero by construction.
The capitalists act only as entrepreneurs and simply organize production. The utility
of a capitalist depends only on the level of his consumption, Cmt, and it is assumed to be
logarithmic:
v (Cmt) = lnCmt (8)
Given that the workers are restricted from accessing the capital markets, the choice of their
utility function has a particular importance. I assume that workers are homogeneous in terms
of their preferences and that both types have the following nonseparable utility function:
u (cit; T   lit) = x (cit; T   lit)
1  
1 
(9)
where
x (cit; T   lit) = [{cit + (1  {) (T   lit)]
1
 , for i = s; u
cit and lit are consumption and individual working hours for a worker of type i, T is the total
number of nonsleeping hours,  > 1, 0   < 1 and 0 < { < 1. The term  = 1= (1  )
is the elasticity of substitution of leisure for consumption and will play a role later in the
paper. The reasons for choosing the specic form of utility function are twofold. First, sep-
arability is usually rejected by the data. In particular, Ham and Reilly (2002) perform tests
and reject additive within-period preferences within an implicit contract model.11 Second,
with separable preferences the Walrasian labor supply would have a positive slope only if the
workers had risk aversion below one. Since the empirical evidence suggests that an individ-
10Parameter e denotes the steady state depreciation rate of capital equipment.
11See also Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985), Altonji and Ham (1990) and Basu and Kimball (2002).
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uals risk aversion is decreasing with his wealth, the capitalist would have risk aversion even
further below one.12 The latter would imply an extremely large elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS) which is at odds with empirical ndings.13
Given that the agents within each group are identical, the resource constraint of the
economy can be written as:
Yt  Cmt + Cst + Cut + Ist + Iet + t (10)
where Cst = scst and Cut = ucut
3.1 The Walrasian Alternative
The Walrasian equilibrium is dened in order to compute the workersreservation utilities.14
To distinguish individual choices from equilibrium outcomes the latter are denoted with a
superscript star, *. When workers trade only in spot markets, decisions follow after f is
observed. The problem of a worker of type i can be written as
maxqsw
P1
t=0 
t
R
= u (cit; T   lit)Pt (ft; dft+1)
subject to 0 < cit  Wit  witlit
(11)
where wit is the wage per hour, qsw = {cit, lit} and 0 <  < 1. The rst-order conditions are
summarized by the following condition:
wSit =
u2 (Wit; T   lit)
u1 (Wit; T   lit) (11a)
12Among others, see Ogaki and Atkeson (1997).
13Empirical ndings suggest that the EIS should be around 0:1 0:2 for an average consumer and around
1 for the wealthy stockholding minority (see Guvenen (2006)).
14The Walrasian market will always constitute an alternative market for the workers. The employment
contract however is designed in such a way that eventually none of the workers will trade in this market.
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where wSit denotes the inverse labor supply. Using (9), the condition above delivers the labor
supply:
l
 
wSit

=
T
{
1
 1 [wSit]

 1 + 1
(11b)
or simply lit = l
 
wSit

where { = {= (1  {). Notice that the response of wages to changes
in labor supply is larger the smaller the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure.
Given an initial state vector 
0 = [f0; Ks0; Ke0]
0, and a stochastic sequence of wage rates
fwitg1t=0 for i = s, u, the dynamic programming problem facing the representative capitalist
can be written as:
V (
0) = maxqsc
P1
t=0 
t
R
= v (Cmt)Pt (ft; dft+1)
subject to eAtF (Kst; UtKet; Lst; Lut)  Cmt
+swstlst + uwutlut + Ist + Iet + t,
Kst+1 = (1  s)Kst + Ist, Ket+1 = (1  e (Ut))Ket + eZtIet
(12)
where qsc ={Cmt, lst, lut, Ut, Kst+1, Ket+1}, Lst = slst and Lut = ulut. The problem of the
capitalist delivers the inverse labor demand, wDit :
wDit =MPLit
where MPLit denotes the marginal product of labor of a worker of type i. In equilibrium,
wSit = w
D
it which implies the following intratemporal e¢ ciency condition:
15
u2 (W

it; T   lit)
u1 (W it; T   lit)
=MPLit (13)
Denition of Spot Equilibrium: A spot equilibrium is a vector of initial conditions 
0 =
[f0; Ks0; Ke0]
0, a set of allocation rules Cmt = C
s
m (
t), K

st+1 = K
s
s (
t), K

et+1 =
15Equilibrium labor hours, lit, are obtained by evaluating l (wit) at wit =MPLit.
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Kse (
t), U

t = U
s (
t), lst = l
s
s (
t) and l

ut = l
s
u (
t), a set of pricing functions w

st =
wss (
t) and w

ut = w
s
u (
t), such that: (i) Workers solve problem (11), taking as given
the aggregate state of the world 
 and the form of functions wss () and wsu (), with
the equilibrium solution to this problem satisfying lst = l
s
s (
t) and l

ut = l
s
u (
t). (ii)
Capitalists solve problem (12), given 
 and the functions wss () and wsu (), with the
equilibrium solution to this problem satisfying Lst = sl
s
s (
t), L

ut = ul
s
u (
t), C

mt =
Csm (
t), K

st+1 = K
s
s (
t), K

et+1 = K
s
e (
t) and U

t = U
s (
t).
The spot skill-premium is expressed as the ratio of skilled to unskilled wage. Given (1),
the logarithm of the skill-premium can be written as a function of input ratios, that is
ln spt = #+
   '
'
ln



UtK

et
Lst
'
+ (1  )

+ (   1) ln

lst
lut

(14)
where # is a constant. Notice, that there are two e¤ects driving the skill-premium: the ratio
of e¤ective capital equipment to skilled hours and the ratio of skilled to unskilled hours.
Krusell et al. (2000), call the latter the relative supply e¤ect and the former the capital-skill
complementarity e¤ect. If capital-skill complementarity is present in the production process
increases in the equipment-skill ratio tend to increase the skill-premium.
3.2 Equilibrium with Contracts
In this section, I assume that at any time t there is a competitive market for one period
ahead contracts. At the end of each contractual period (t 1) capitalists o¤er the skilled and
the unskilled workers menus fWs (ft 1; ft), Ls (ft 1; ft)g and fWu (ft 1; ft), Lu (ft 1; ft)g of
possible labor earnings and working hours which will be in e¤ect the following period (t). As
in Beaudry and DiNardo (1995), wages and hours depend on both the market conditions at
the time the contract is signed and the market conditions at the time the contract will be in
e¤ect, and thus are functions of both ft 1 and ft. These contracts are perfectly enforceable
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at no observable cost to either party (i.e workers and employers are expected to honor the
agreement). To avoid dealing with issues of asymmetric information I assume that the
realization of shocks is public information. The contract is designed so that the capitalist
and the worker always reach an agreement.
As noted by Boldrin and Horvath (1995), both workers and capitalists have an incentive
to sign labor contracts. When there is a recession and the labor market is driven by a
Walrasian mechanism the workers experience a severe fall in their utility. Consequently,
workers are willing to accept a contract scheme that prevents such big declines. On the
other hand, the capitalists exhibit higher tolerance for aggregate risk and thereby, desire
to exploit the higher gains during expansions in exchange of undergoing a larger fraction
of losses during recessions. As stated by Rosen (1985), implicit contracts embody implicit
payments of insurance premiums by workers in favorable states of nature and receipt of
indemnities in unfavorable states.
Every period, both skilled and unskilled workers have reservation utilities denoted by ust
and uut, respectively. The reservation utility is the lower bound of the expected utility that
workers require in order to sign a contract. An optimal contract guarantees that the expected
utility is at least the same as the reservation utility over the lifetime of the contract.16 If
the expected utility from signing a contract is less than the acceptable lower bound then,
the workers will trade in the spot market. The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) or
commitment constraint for a worker of type i can be written as:
uit  Et [u (Wit+1; T   lit+1)] 
Z
=
u (Wi (ft; ft+1) ; T   li (ft; ft+1))Pt (ft; dft+1) (15)
16As noted by Hart and Holmström (1987), optimality is not to be understood in a rst-best sense, but
rather in a constraint or second-best sense because of informational restrictions. These restrictions arise due
to the uncertainty about future realizations of f .
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where
uit = Et
h
u
ewit+1elit+1; T   elit+1i
 RL uewi (
t+1)eli ( ewi (
t+1)) ; T   eli ( ewi (
t+1))Q (
t; d
t+1)
where the space L = = x | denotes the set of feasible 
s and Q (
t; d
t+1) is the equilibrium
transition function (see Boldrin and Horvath (1995)). Variables Wi and li are income and
working hours under the contract for a worker of type i and ewi and eli are the equilibrium
wage and working hours for a worker of type i that trades in a spot market while all other
workers in the group signed a contract. The spot-market wage is the marginal product of
labor evaluated at the labor supply of the workers under contract. The individual spot-
market labor supply is the choice of labor hours dened in equation (11b). The ICC implies
that a contract which is agreed in favorable market conditions will generally be superior than
a contract agreed in unfavorable market conditions because the reservation utility will tend
to be higher.
The capitalist needs to o¤er contracts, fWs (ft; ft+1), Ls (ft; ft+1)g and fWu (ft; ft+1),
Lu (ft; ft+1)g, to workers of both skill types and simultaneously choose future capital stocks,
the utilization rate of capital and his consumption level. As shown by Boldrin and Horvath
(1995), the equilibrium in the contracts economy can be derived from two separate problems.
In the rst problem, the capitalist takes parametrically Cmt+1, U

t+1, K

st+1, K

et+1, K

st+2 and
Ket+2 and chooses labor contracts for both types of workers which maximize his expected
14
utility:17
maxqcc
R
= v (Cmt+1)Pt (ft; dft+1) subject to
uit 
R
= u (Wi (ft; ft+1) ; T   li (ft; ft+1))Pt (ft; dft+1) for i = s and u,
eAt+1F
 
Kst+1; U

t+1K

et+1; Ls (ft; ft+1) ; Lu (ft; ft+1)
  Cmt+1
+sWs (ft; ft+1) + uWu (ft; ft+1) + I

st+1 + I

et+1 + 

t+1,
Kst+2 = (1  s)Kst+1 + Ist+1, Ket+2 =
 
1  e
 
Ut+1

Ket+1 + e
Zt+1Iet+1
(16)
where qcc = fWs (), Ls ()g, fWu (), Lu ()g. Competition in the market of contracts ensures
that in equilibrium all capitalists o¤er identical menus of wages and labor hours. In the
second problem, the capitalist chooses future capital stocks, the utilization rate of capital
and his consumption to maximize expected utility subject to the budget constraint and
capital accumulation equations, taking as given the optimal contracts:
(
t;W
c
s () ; Lcs () ;W cu () ; Lcu ()) = maxqccfv (Cmt)
+
R
=(
t+1;W
c
s () ; Lcs () ;W cu () ; Lcu ())Pt (ft; dft+1)g
subject to eAtF (Kst; UtKet; Lcs () ; Lcu ())  Cmt + sW cs ()
+uW cu () +Kst+1   (1  s)Kst + e ZtKet+1   (1  e (Ut)) e ZtKet
+ s
2
(Kst+1  Kst)2 + u2
 
e ZtKet+1   (1  e (Ut)) e ZtKet   eKet
2
(17)
where W ci (), Lci () denote the equilibrium solution to (16) as a function of the state and of
other equilibrium variables, and qcc = Cmt, Ut, Kst+1, Ket+1.
Denition of the Contracts Equilibrium: An equilibrium for the contracts economy
is a vector of initial conditions [f0; Ks0; Ke0] and a set of functions W cs (), Lcs (),
W cu (), Lcu (), Ccm (), Kcs (), Kce () and U c () depending on the state vector 
t =
[ft 1; ft; Kst; Kut]
0 such that:18 (i) W cs (), Lcs (), W cu () and Lcu () solve problem (16)
17The capitalist is choosing a pair of fWi; Ligi=s;u for each possible realization of the vector ft+1, condi-
tional on the current realization of ft.
18Decisions for next periods wage bill and hours of work are made in the current period (i.e conditional
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for all 
t given Ccm (), Kcs (), Kce () and U c (). (ii) Ccm (), Kcs (), Kce () and U c ()
solve problem (17) for all 
t given W cs (), Lcs (), W cu () and Lcu ().
It is important to note that the optimal contract is described by the ICC and the following
intratemporal e¢ ciency condition (see Beaudry and DiNardo (1995)):19
u2
 
W cit+1; T   lcit+1

u1
 
W cit+1; T   lcit+1
 =MPLit+1 (18)
Condition (18) di¤ers from condition (13) in that the hourly wage in (18) is not equal
to marginal productivity. This has di¤erent implications on the dynamics of the model.
Condition (18) implies that while an increase in MPL tends to increase labor hours, an
increase in the hourly wage tends to decrease hours. In other words, changes in wages
induce only income e¤ects on hours.20
In an economy with contracts wages are not perfectly correlated with the marginal prod-
uct of labor. Other than the e¤ect of MPL, contract wages and the skill-premium are
directly a¤ected by the elasticities of substitution of consumption for leisure and the ratios
of leisure to labor. Using the functional forms for preferences and technology, (18) is reduced
to an explicit function of the equilibrium hourly wage. The logarithm of the contract wage
can be expressed as:
lnwcoit =  +  lnw
sp
it + ln

T   lit
lit

, for i = s; u (19)
on the current realization of shocks, the capitalists o¤er a contract which species a wage bill and working
hours for each possible future realization of shocks). Therefore, the level of equilibrium variables not only
depends on current period shocks but also on previous period shocks. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), show
that this feature of implicit contracts is empirically signicant.
19As pointed out by Beaudry and DiNardo, the addition of the commitment constraint, (15), does not
create any trade-o¤ between ex post e¢ ciency and optimal risk sharing between workers and capitalists.
20Beaudry and DiNardo (1995), Cooley and Ogaki (1996) and Ham and Reilly (2002) nd strong evidence
in favor of the implicit contract theory by testing the intratemporal condition.
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and the logarithm of the skill-premium can be expressed as:
ln cot =  ln 
sp
t + ln

(T   lst) =lst
(T   lut) =lut

(20)
where wsp is the spot wage or MPL, and  is a constant. As shown in equation (19),
the harder it is to substitute consumption for leisure (the smaller  is) the less responsive
the contract wage is to variations in marginal product uctuations. Likewise,  controls the
elasticity of the contract skill-premium to variations in the spot skill-premium. The existence
of real rigidities takes the form of risk sharing between workers and capitalists. Changes in
hours induce signicant opposite e¤ects on wages via the third term of equation (19). An
increase (decrease) in hours tends to decrease (increase) the ratio of leisure to labor which is
positively related to the wage. For instance, during expansions where labor hours increase
the worker receives a wage below his marginal productivity whereas during recessions where
labor hours decrease he receives a wage above his marginal productivity. This prevents
the workers utility from dropping a lot during recessions and enables the capitalist to reap
most of the benet during expansions. The risk-sharing component has an impact on the
skill-premium via the second term of equation (20).
4 Quantitative Analysis of the Model
4.1 Numerical Solution and Calibration
To solve the model numerically, the stochastic processes of technology shocks are parameter-
ized. Both Harrod-neutral and investment specic shocks are assumed to behave according
to the following independent AR (1) processes:
At = AAt 1 + "At
Zt = ZZt 1 + "Zt
(21)
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where "At  iidN (0; 2"A), "Zt  iidN (0; 2"Z) with 0 < A < 1, 0 < Z < 1 and E ("At"Zt) =
0.21 Following Horvath (1994) and Boldrin and Horvath (1995), the solution is obtained by
linearizing the rst-order conditions of problems (16) and (17) around the non-stochastic
steady state values. The optimal rules are obtained by expressing all variables as functions
of the state vector 
t using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients.22
Notice that the values of the non-stochastic steady states are the same for both the Wal-
rasian and the contract economy because the existence of contracts is due to the uncertainty
about the realization of shocks. In other words, in a deterministic environment the Walrasian
and the contract economy are equivalent. There are twenty three parameters to be calibrated
: ve preference parameters, {, m, {, , }, eleven parameters specifying the production
process, {, , , , ', s, e, !, b, s, e}, four parameters pertaining to the stochastic
processes, {A, Z , "A, "Z} and three parameters determining the time endowment and
employment, {T , s, u}. These parameters imply steady state values for all the variables,
{cm, ks, ke, ls, le, U , ws, we}. The model is calibrated such that the parameters lie within a
range consistent with the existing literature and implying steady states that are consistent
with patterns observed in the data.
First, I normalize the total number of nonsleeping hours per average person, T , to unity.
Then, the following parameters are chosen based on a priori information:
(i) e = 0:027. Cummins and Violante (2002) back out the appropriate annual physical
depreciation rates for capital equipment using the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis)
measures of economic depreciation and their measure for the Z-process. The depreciation
rate e is set to match the average of the annualized depreciation rates.
(ii) s = 0:014. The depreciation rate for structures is set to match the annualized value
calibrated by Greenwood et al. (1997).23
21For the sake of simplicity, and given that the attention is focused on business cycles, I assume that the
stochastic processes are stationary.
22The elements of the state vector are percentage deviations from steady state values.
23There is no evidence that the depreciation rates changed signicantly over the recent years.
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(iii)  = 0:117,  = 0:401, ' =  0:495. The share of capital structures in output and
the parameters determining the elasticities of substitution between inputs were estimated in
Krusell et al. (2000).24
(iv)  = 10. Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002) and Vissing-Jørgensen (1998) estimate
euler equations and nd that the EIS of nonstockholders di¤ers widely from that of stock-
holders which is close to unity. Following Guvenen (2006), the workerscoe¢ cient of risk
aversion is chosen to be 10 so that the workers are substantially more risk averse than the
capitalists. In my sensitivity analysis, I also investigate the e¤ects of reducing , by studying
the case  = 5.
Based on averages of US data and information from previous empirical studies I im-
pose several restrictions on the steady state equations. As noted by Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006, a), there is a tight relationship between being an entrepreneur and being rich. Cagetti
and De Nardi (2005, b) use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and report
that households in the top 20% of wealth distribution hold 81% of the wealth in the US
economy. They also nd nd that a signicant fraction of the population holds little or no
wealth at all. Likewise, Guvenen (2006) uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and nds that 20% of the wealthiest households hold about 90% of capital and land
and nearly all nancial assets.25 For those reasons, I choose the share of capitalists in total
population to be 25%.26 The calibrated model produces similar results even when the share
of capitalists is set to 20%. The fraction of skilled workers in aggregate employment is about
30%.27 Following Young (2003), I assume that at the steady state the average worker takes
30% of his time endowment as labor and that skilled workers work, on average, 20% more
than unskilled workers. The former is consistent with the American Time Use Surveys and
24The results do not change signicantly for values around the Krusell et al. estimates.
25In an earlier paper, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) present evidence that no more than 25% of households
own all the equity in US.
26Changes in wealth distribution, and especially changes in the right tale of the distribution are likely to
be slow.
27This number is consistent with estimates from CPS data (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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the latter with estimates by Welch (1997). The steady state ratios of investment to output
are set to match the average ratios in the data. I set the steady state utilization of capital
equipment, U , equal to 80% using the average capacity utilization in Industrial Production
reported by the Federal Reserve Board as a proxy.28
The functional form for the labor supply implies that the elasticity of labor supply de-
creases as the wage increases. In other words, workers with higher wages have a lower
elasticity of labor supply. The long-run trend of the average measure of wages the period
1979-2003 indicates that skilled wages are about 75% higher than unskilled wages.29 It fol-
lows that the steady state elasticity of unskilled labor supply, u;w, is greater than that of
skilled labor, s;w. In particular, the former is 8:57% higher than the latter. This steady
state implication is consistent with recent empirical ndings. Among others, Kimball and
Shapiro (2008), estimate labor supply elasticities for individuals with di¤erent educational
attainment (high school diploma; some college; college degree) using survey data from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). They nd that individuals with college degrees have
substantially lower labor supply elasticities than individuals with some college education or
no college education.30 Blau and Kahn (2007), report similar results by focusing on the labor
supply behavior of married women using data from CPS. The role of the elasticity of labor
supply will be examined in the following section.
Output can be written as a function of capital structures and other parameters using the
euler equation for capital structures:
y =
1   (1  s)

ks (22)
28This value is within the range of values that appear in the literature. The model is not very sensitive
around the chosen value.
29Notwithstanding the standard average measure might not be the best measure for the cyclical properties
of real wages, it is a reasonable indicator of the level of the skill-premium during the sample period.
30The survey question which was designed by Kimball and Shapiro asks respondents to imagine what they
would do if they won a sweepstakes. Their ndings suggest that labor supply elasticities of college graduates
are not only smaller relative to individuals with little education but can become negative due to the fact
that the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect.
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Then, the steady state ratio of aggregate investment to output is
i
y
=
s (1 + ie=is)
1   (1  s) (23)
Using (22) and the values for is=y and ie=y I pin down the discount factor . Furthermore,
the following equations must hold at the steady state:
y = AF (ks; Uke; Ls; Lu) (24)
1 = UAF2 (ks; Uke; Ls; Lu) +  (1  e) (25)
!e = UAF2 (ks; Uke; Ls; Lu) (26)
where (24) is the production function, (25) is the euler equation for capital equipment and
(26) is the optimality condition for capital utilization. Substituting out y from (24) using
(22), equations (24)-(26) along with the restriction that the skill-premium equals 1:75 com-
prise a system of four equations in four unknowns, {, , ks, !}. The choice for ! pins
down the value of b using (4). Even though the literature does not provide any guide for
assigning magnitudes to  and { the two labor supply equations imply unique values for the
two parameters, given the steady state values of wages and hours. In section 4:2:2, I examine
the sensitivity of the results by allowing the utility parameters to be di¤erent across skilled
and unskilled workers, i.e s and {s for skilled workers and u and {u for unskilled workers.
It is shown that each pair of (s, u) corresponds to a unique value of relative labor supply
elasticity u;w=s;w. In the analysis of section 4:2:2, I examine a wide range of values for the
latter.
Adjustment costs are zero at the steady state and thereby, parameters s and e do
not appear in the equations at the steady state. Moreover, there is no data on adjustment
costs and hence, there is no a priori information to pin down the corresponding parameters.
Consequently, s and e are chosen so that the volatilities of each type of investment equal
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those observed in the data over the sample period.
Finally, I am left with the parameters pertaining to the stochastic processes, {A, Z ,
"A, "Z}. Following Greenwood et al. (1997; 2000), the stochastic process of investment
specic shocks is identied by the inverse of the real price of investment in equipment. The
real price of equipment is dened as the ratio of the equipment deator and the consumption
deator. The reference for measurement of investment specic technologies is Gordon (1990).
Gordons series are annual and cover only the period 1947-1983.31 Cummins and Violante
(2002) estimate the quality bias implicit in the NIPA price indexes using Gordons series and
then extrapolate the quality bias in the period 1984-2000. In this way, they extend Gordons
series by constructing annual quality-adjusted series through 2000. For the purpose of the
current study, a further issue is that there are no quality adjusted quarterly series for the
equipment deator. Following Fisher (2003), I use the Gordon-Cummins-Violante annual
series and the quarterly series from NIPA data to obtain quarterly quality-adjusted measures.
To interpolate the adjusted series I use Dentons (1971)method that minimizes the distortion
of the original NIPA series via a penalty function and satises the condition that the average
of the adjusted series, each year, equals the annual quality adjusted deator of Gordon-
Cummins-Violante.32 In practice, the logarithm of the inverse of the real price of investment
is a nonstationary process and exhibits a unit root.33 I identify the Z-process by estimating
the following regression:
ln

Pc
Pi

t
= $1 +$1 ln

Pc
Pi

t 1
+ Zt
31Several studies (eg Gordon (1990), Cummins and Violante (2002)) report that the quarterly NIPA data
series for the price of equipment is a biased measure of investment specic technological progress.
32I employ a penalty function based on the proportionate di¤erences between the rst di¤erences of the
NIPA and adjusted series. The Gordon-Cummins-Violante series was extended for the years 2001-2003 by
adjusting the annual measures based on the pattern of NIPA data.
33The null hypothesis of a unit root is decidedly not rejected by the Phillips-Perron test which takes into
account serially correlated disturbances. Fisher (2003) allows for a unit root in a standard RBC model with
a Cobb-Douglas production function and shows how all variables can be transformed in order to be expressed
as stationary. In the present model I ignore the growth part of the process and deal only with the transitory
shocks that induce the desired business cycles.
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where Pc is the consumption deator, Pi is the price of investment goods, c and d are
constants and Zt follows (21). Using the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation procedure and the
quarterly 1979:1-2003:4 sample, the estimated parameters are34
$1 = 0:013
(0:0019)
, $2 = 1:001
(0:0031)
, Z = 0:6015
(0:0827)
, Z = 0:0047 with DW statistic = 2:02
where the numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. It is more di¢ cult to estimate the
A-process because the utilization rate of capital equipment is unobserved. For this reason
I set A = 0:95, which is the value typically used in RBC literature, and then assume that
the two shocks are jointly responsible for the whole variation of output. Thus, I set "A so
that the volatility of output in the model matches the volatility observed in the data. The
calibrated model demonstrates that investment specic shocks account for 16% of output
uctuations.35 It is also worth noting that the specic parameterization implies that the
steady state of labor share in income is 72% which is about the same as that observed in the
data. The assigned parameter values are displayed in table 1. Table 3 displays parameter
values for di¤erent calibration exercises which are conducted to examine the sensitivity of
the model to various parameter values and structural features.
4.2 Model vs Data
This section evaluates the business cycle properties of the model. The predictions of the
model are assessed by comparing the generated standard deviations and cross-correlations
between output and the other variables with corresponding statistics from US data.36 Par-
34The estimates of interest are robust to di¤erent estimation methods (eg. Hildreth-Lu and maximum
likelihood grid search procedures).
35Greenwood et al. (2000) nd that investment specic shocks is the source of about 30% of output
uctuations. Fisher (2006) nds that investment specic shocks account for 42  67% of output uctuations
while both shocks jointly account for 44  80% of output variability.
36The measures of wages and labor hours are expressed in e¢ ciency units and were constructed by Castro
and Coen-Pirani (2008). These measures control for the cyclical change in demographic composition as well
as various aggregation e¤ects. In their analysis, Castro and Coen-Pirani nd that the volatility of the working
hours of skilled labor increased substantially after 1984. In contrast, the cyclical properties of unskilled hours
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ticularly, I compare the moments of HP ltered series from the model with moments of HP
ltered series from the data. Table 2 displays statistics from US data and the benchmark
model while tables 4 and 5 display statistics from various calibration exercises, including a
model where technology is not characterized by capital-skill complementarity and a model
where capital utilization is constant.
4.2.1 The Benchmark Model
I. Statistical Moments
The benchmark model reasonably captures the properties of basic macroeconomic reg-
ularities. Investment is more volatile than output which, in turn, is more volatile than
consumption. The correlations generated by the model indicate that the comovement of
variables is fairly close to those of US data. Wages and the skill-premium do not move sys-
tematically over the business cycle and exhibit similar behavior to the data. Even though the
utilization of capital is strongly procyclical and the production is characterized by capital-
skill complementarity, the correlation between the skill-premium and output is close to zero
as in the data. The analysis demonstrates that variable capital utilization is not only con-
sistent with the cyclical behavior of the skill-premium but it is also a necessary mechanism
in the model. The latter is illustrated in the following sections. The analysis indicates
that investment-specic shocks alone explain up to 16% of outputs uctuations. In con-
trast to standard RBC models, labor productivity does not appear to be perfectly correlated
with output. Nevertheless, low skilled workers have more volatile wages than high skilled
workers.37
as well as the cyclical properties of real wages remained essentially unchanged over the pre-1984 and the
post-1984 periods. Since the main focus of the paper is on the behavior of real wages and not on the change
in the volatility of skilled hours, I do not examine the pre-1984 period separately from the post-1984 period.
Details about the rest of the data are provided in the Appendix.
37Di¤erences in the volatilities of wages and hours among the two types of workers could be related to
di¤erences in the duration of contracts. If skilled workers hold, on average, contracts of a longer duration
then, one would expect skilled wages to be less volatile than unskilled wages. This issue is not examined
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II. Impulse Response Functions
While a Harrod-neutral shock increases the marginal e¢ ciency of capital and labor inputs,
an investment-specic shock increases the marginal e¢ ciency of investment in equipment.
This section analyzes the di¤erent e¤ects of the two shocks on the macroeconomic aggregates.
Impulse response functions (IRFs) are displayed in gures 1 and 2.
Output, investment, the utilization of capital equipment, labor productivity and labor
hours exhibit an immediate and positive response to both Harrod-neutral and investment-
specic shocks. Consumption responds positively only after a Harrod-neutral shock and
declines a little after an investment specic shock. The latter is due to the fact that the
workersconsumption does not react much to the shock whereas the capitalists consumption
decreases substantially. As pointed out by Barro and King (1984) and discussed by Green-
wood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988), shocks that improve the marginal e¢ ciency of newly
produced capital induce individuals to lower consumption. Not surprisingly this behavior
holds true for the capitalists consumption.38
The wages for both types of workers have an immediate and negative response to both
Harrod-neutral and investment specic shocks. The induced income e¤ects increase work
e¤ort substantially for both types of workers and thereby, production. The shocks a¤ect
the workersreservation utilities whose e¤ects are evident in next periods wages and hours.
Thus, the highest impact on wages occurs during the quarter that follows a shock reecting
the strong inuence of market conditions at the time the contract is signed. Lagakos and
Ordonez (2007) nd that wages in low-wage industries respond more to productivity shocks
than wages in high-wage industries. Since the wage of skilled workers is higher than the wage
of unskilled workers we expect a larger response of the latter to a productivity shock. Indeed,
as shown in gure 1, the unskilled wage responds more to a neutral productivity shock than
here.
38The Walrasian model predicts consumption to be lower than the steady state along the entire impulse
response function (see Lindquist (2004), p532, gure 2).
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the skilled wage does. The following section illustrates that the latter is reversed when the
utilization of capital is held constant over time. Variable utilization of capital equipment
has two signicant roles in the model. First, it magnies and propagates the shocks over the
business cycle and second, it di¤erentiates the e¤ects of shocks on labor variables.
A neutral technology shock induces an increase in production and also an increase in the
workers reservation utility. The increase in the wage of unskilled workers is larger because
the increase in their reservation utility is greater than that of skilled workers. As I show
in section 4.2.2, the latter is due to the fact that low-skilled labor is much cheaper than
high-skilled labor. As a result, there is a margin to increase unskilled wages relatively more
than skilled wages in response to a neutral shock. The income e¤ect on hours for unskilled
workers the period after the shock is strong enough to make hours fall below their steady
state. The income e¤ect on skilled workers is not as strong as to cause a similar response
for skilled hours. Even though unskilled hours decrease after an improvement in technology,
the capitalists can still exploit the higher gains by increasing the utilization of capital. As it
will be shown in the following section, the response of unskilled hours to the shock changes
when the mechanism of endogenous capital utilization is not available.
The responses of wages to investment-specic shocks are di¤erent from those associated
with neutral technology shocks. The decline in equipments replacement value lowers the
marginal utilization cost. This leads to an increase in the utilization of capital and next
periods capital stock. The latter motivates an increase in total hours for both types of
workers. In order to increase unskilled hours which are, on average, twice as many as total
skilled hours a small income e¤ect is necessary. Consequently, entrepreneurs o¤er unskilled
workers a lower wage. It turns out that the latter is not necessary for skilled workers.
The skill-premium does not peak until the period following an investment-specic shock and
decreases after a delay of one quarter following a Harrod-neutral shock. Thus, Harrod-neutral
shocks tend to decrease wage inequality whereas investment-specic shocks tend to increase
it. The mixed response of wages to the shocks produces a contemporaneous correlation
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between the skill-premium and output that is close to zero.
The fact that the skill-premium behaves oppositely to relative hours is an indication that
it is mainly driven by those than the ratio of e¤ective capital to skilled labor. Hence, it seems
that the relative supply e¤ect dominates the capital-skill complementarity e¤ect. This result
is not surprising since the contract skill-premium is a function of three terms of relative hours
and only one term of the ratio of e¤ective capital to skilled labor.39 The dominance of the
relative supply e¤ect is conrmed in the sensitivity analysis of section 4.2.2.
III. Autocorrelations
Auto-correlograms of output, consumption and investment are displayed in gure 7. Al-
though the autocorrelation functions are not as smooth as they appear to be in the data they
follow a similar pattern. As shown in gure 2, the impact of shocks on investment is not
very persistent because only a small fraction of aggregate consumption is smoothed through
the savings channel. This means that investment decisions in the model are irrelevant for a
large fraction of the population for whom consumption smoothing is achieved only via labor
contracts. Apparently, this property of the model a¤ects the behavior of investment. The
lack of persistency in investment also has an impact on the low autocorrelations of output,
partly due to changes in capital. The lack of smoothness in the correlation functions might
be related to the fact that actual contracts usually have a longer duration and are negotiated
in various time periods. The present model successfully captures the idea that decisions in
the labor market are made prior to the realization of shocks and practically gives us a better
understanding of the role of contracts in the dynamics of wages and the skill-premium.
4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I examine the sensitivity of the model to changes in certain parameter values
and di¤erent model specications. Each time a parameter value or a model specication is
39Impulse response functions of the capital-skill ratio and relative hours are displayed in gure 6.
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changed, the rest of the parameters are re-calibrated according to the procedure described
in section 4:1. The parameter values for the various calibration exercises can be found in
tables 1 and 3.
First, I examine the sensitivity of the baseline model in the case where the di¤erence
in risk aversion between capitalists and workers decreases. Specically, I examine the case
where  equals 5. As shown in table 2, most of the results do not signicantly change.
Wages become slightly more volatile and moderately countercyclical while labor productivity
becomes much less procyclical.40 Second, I examine the sensitivity of the results to the feature
of capital-skill complementarity. In particular, I set the elasticities of substitution between
capital equipment and the two labor inputs to be equal so that the skill-premium is only
driven by relative hours.41 The statistics in table 4 (columns 1), show that the results are
nearly identical to the benchmark case. Contrary to the case of the Walrasian model (see
Lindquist, 2004), the model with contracts is not sensitive to the degree of substitutability
between capital equipment and labor of di¤erent skill types.
In order to examine the importance of variable utilization of capital equipment I set
the utilization rate equal to unity and hold it constant over time. In addition, I set the
depreciation rate of equipment equal to its steady state value. Corresponding statistics can
be found in table 4 (columns 2). The models performance is somewhat di¤erent in this
case. When a neutral productivity shock occurs the production can be increased further
only if work e¤ort increases. As a result, in the absence of endogenous capital utilization the
capitalists also need to increase unskilled labor the period that follows the shock. In order to
cause an increase in unskilled hours, through the income e¤ect, the capitalists o¤er unskilled
workers a relatively lower wage. Then, both types of shocks tend to increase wage inequality
and thereby, the mixed response produces a procyclical skill-premium. The results do not
40Unreported impulse response functions indicate that the decrease in workers risk aversion causes a
greater immediate and negative response of wages to both types of shocks.
41The experiment is similar to that conducted by Krusell et al. (2000). Specically, I set  = ' = 1=3
which yields an elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor that is consistent with estimates
reported by Johnson (1997).
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change substantially when capital-skill complementarity does not characterize the production
function.
A property of variable capital utilization is that it magnies and propagates shocks over
the business cycle. In the absence of this mechanism larger neutral shocks are required to
match the observed volatility of output. Calibration exercises and impulse response functions
signify that technology neutral shocks tend to produce procyclical wages whereas investment
specic shocks are associated with countercyclical wages. Since neutral technology shocks
are larger, the new mix of shocks generates procyclical wages.42
To examine the sensitivity of the model to di¤erences in labor supply elasticities across
skilled and unskilled workers I relax the assumption that the utility parameters are the same
across workers of di¤erent skill types. Specically, I assume that the utility parameters i
and {i change with the skill level of the worker (i.e i = s, u). Then, given the steady state
values of wi and li, for any value of i there is a corresponding unique value of {i. It follows
that for each pair (s, u) there is a unique steady state relative elasticity of labor supply,
u;w=s;w. Experimenting with di¤erent pairs (s, u) enables me to examine the sensitivity
of the model across a wide range of values for u;w=s;w. The surface plots of gure 3, show
the latter for di¤erent pairs (s, u). Table 5 provides statistics from the model, calibrated
for indicative values of u;w=s;w; 0:65 (columns 3), 1:60 (columns 4) and 60 (columns 5).43
The statistics designate that changes in model dynamics which occur in response to di¤erent
steady state values for the relative labor supply are very minor. As a result, this dimension
of heterogeneity across workers is not so signicant.
Next, I x u;w=s;w to its benchmark value and experiment with di¤erent values for the
steady state level of the skill-premium. Even though the benchmark value for the latter is
the average observed in the data, analysis of how the model responds to di¤erent values can
provide a better understanding of the extent to which this value impacts the dynamics of the
42The new mix of shocks indicates that investment specic shocks can explain only 5   6% of output
uctuations.
43The steady state level of the skill-premium is held to its benchmark value of 1:75.
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model. Table 5 displays model statistics for the cases where ws=wu is 1:60 (columns 6) and
1:85 (columns 7). Unreported impulse response functions for the case where ws=wu equals
1:60 indicate that a narrower wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers induces bigger
immediate decreases for the wages of both skill types in response to a Harrod-neutral shock.
This follows from (19) in which the e¤ect of the insurance component dominates the increase
in marginal productivity. As a result, wages become more countercyclical compared to the
benchmark case. This experiment also demonstrates that for lower levels of wage inequality,
the skill-premium becomes more procyclical. The immediate decrease of the unskilled wage
is relatively bigger which makes the sign of the contemporaneous correlation between the
skill-premium and output positive. On the other hand, increasing the steady state value of
the skill-premium to 1:85 makes the initial response of wages to the neutral shock positive
and thus, the contemporaneous correlations with output positive. In addition, as steady state
wage inequality increases, the instant wage response of unskilled labor becomes relatively
bigger. This induces a negative contemporaneous correlation between the skill-premium and
output. In other words, cheaper unskilled labor relative to skilled labor allows a higher
margin for rms to increase relatively more the wages of unskilled workers in response to an
improvement in technology.44
5 Conclusion
The nding that capital-skill complementarity is an important determinant of the long-run
behavior of the skill-premium inuenced the recent research on wage inequality. Over the
business cycle neither real wages nor the skill-premium exhibit a systematic pattern. The
latter raises doubts about whether the labor market is purely Walrasian. Furthermore, a
previous study shows that if the labor market is Walrasian and rms are allowed to vary
44Note that apart from the changes in the sign of initial responses of wst and wut as well as the scale of
the responses, the pattern of the shape of the responses remains roughly unchanged, with either ws=wu =
1:60 or ws=wu = 1:85. Finally, in the latter case, unskilled hours become acyclical.
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the utilization of capital then, capital-skill complementarity generates strongly procyclical
skill-premia which are at odds with the empirical ndings. Labor contracts constitute an
alternative explanation for the movement of real wages. This paper analyzes the behavior of
the skill-premium in a DSGE model where agents trade labor contracts and the utilization
of capital equipment is endogenous.
The model economy is populated by risk averse workers and less risk averse entrepreneurs
that own the capital stock of the economy. Since the workers cannot access capital markets
to shed income risk the labor contracts are the only insurance device available to them. The
model generates the weak contemporaneous correlation of wages and the skill-premium with
output while performing well in matching basic macroeconomic regularities. Contrary to
previous ndings, it is shown that the feature of capital-skill complementarity is not central
to the behavior of the skill-premium at high frequencies. The risk-sharing component of
real wages reinforces the e¤ect of the relative labor supply which dominates the capital-skill
complementarity e¤ect. The analysis also illustrates that the level of wage inequality plays a
signicant role in short-run dynamics. Finally, the paper demonstrates that variable capital
utilization rates are not only consistent with the behavior of the skill-premium but constitute
a necessary aspect of the model. In the absence of endogenous capital utilization, wages and
the skill-premium become considerably procyclical.
Appendix: Data
The measures of wages are expressed in e¢ ciency units. These measures were con-
structed by Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) by drawing data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS).45 Nominal consumption c = cm + scst + ucut is measured as the sum of per-
45Mean and median wages produce similar statistics.
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sonal consumption expenditures for durable and nondurable goods and services, government
consumption expenditures and investment in residential structures. Nominal investment in
structures is is measured as the sum of producers investment in nonresidential structures
and governments investment in structures. Nominal investment in equipment ie is measured
as the sum of producers and governments investment in equipment and software. Nominal
output, y, is measured as c + is + ie plus net exports and the change in private invento-
ries. All variables are measured in consumption units, as they are expressed in the resource
constraint. They are deated using a common implicit consumption deator, deseasonalized
using the Census Bureaus seasonal adjustment program, logged and Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
ltered before computing statistics.
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Table 1 - Values of Calibration Parameters for the benchmark case
s 0.9  0.545  0.117
u 2.1  0.401 ! 0.6482  = 10  = 5
T 1 s 0.014  0.4503 s 2.935 6.36
 0.321 e 0.027 Z 0.6015 e 2.42 5.14
{ 0.3991 ' -0.495 "Z 0.0047 "A 0.0069 0.0052
 0.9828 b 0.0643 A 0.9500
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Table 2 - Statistical Moments: Quarterly US data, 1979:1-2003:4,
and the benchmark model
x x (%) corr (xt; yt)
US data Model US data Model
 = 10  = 5  = 10  = 5
Output 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.00 1.00 1.00
Aggregate consumption 1.22 1.19 1.02 0.83 0.93 0.95
Investment in structures 4.36 4.36 4.36 0.36 0.69 0.86
Investment in equipment 4.23 4.23 4.23 0.87 0.73 0.90
Aggregate investment 3.73 4.04 4.22 0.76 0.76 0.90
Average labor productivity 0.50 1.04 0.91 0.50 0.72 0.26
Capitalists consumption ... 2.94 4.37 ... 0.88 0.92
Capital Utilization 2.51 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.94 0.94
Skilled wage 1.12 0.84 0.92 0.34 0.22 -0.54
Unskilled wage 0.80 1.23 1.50 0.30 0.18 -0.51
Aggregate wage 0.89 1.13 1.35 0.31 0.18 -0.52
Skill-premium 0.60 0.49 0.77 0.09 -0.09 0.35
Skilled labor hours 0.99 0.68 0.84 0.69 0.95 0.97
Unskilled labor hours 1.19 1.18 1.86 0.73 0.54 0.71
Aggregate labor hours 1.00 0.96 1.45 0.82 0.67 0.79 
modely =
data
y
 jmodelA =0 ... 0.16 0.11
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Table 3 - Values of parameters for di¤erent calibration exercises
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ws
wu
1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.6 1.85
u;w
s;w
1.0857 1.0857 1.0857 0.65 1.6 60 1.0857 1.0857
s 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.3215 0.2429 0.0415 0.3602 0.3007
u 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.221 0.321 0.7053 0.3602 0.3007
{s 0.4164 0.3916 0.3916 0.3992 0.3843 0.3471 0.4097 0.3937
{u 0.4164 0.3916 0.3916 0.3609 0.3991 0.5532 0.4097 0.3937
 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10
 0.4153 0.4684 0.4684 0.4503 0.4503 0.4503 0.4717 0.437
 0.2021 0.584 0.584 0.545 0.545 0.5450 0.5584 0.5368
s 3.23 2.285 6.67 3.01 3.02 2.6260 4.73 1.5
e 3.02 1.282 3.22 2.46 2.46 2.21 3.84 1.358
"A 0.0068 0.0076 0.0068 0.00715 0.0071 0.00585 0.0054 0.00825
The columns of the table correspond to the following cases: (1) model without capital-
skill complementarity, i.e  = ' = 1=3, (2) model with constant capital utilization, i.e Ut= 1
and e(U t) = e with (a)  = 10 and (b)  = 5, (3) u;w=s;w= 0.65 and ws=wu= 1.75, (4)
u;w=s;w= 1.60 and ws=wu= 1.75 and (5) u;w=s;w= 60 and ws=wu= 1.75, (6) ws=wu= 1.60 and
u;w=s;w= 1:0857, (7) ws=wu= 1.85 and u;w=s;w= 1:0857. The values of the parameters not
specied in the table are the same as the ones in the benchmark case.
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Table 4 - Statistical Moments: The model without capital-skill complementarity
and the model with constant capital utilization
x x (%) corr (xt; yt)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
 = 10  = 10  = 5  = 10  = 10  = 5
Output 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.00 1.00 1.00
Aggregate consumption 1.15 1.14 1.04 0.94 0.95 0.95
Investment in structures 4.36 4.36 4.36 0.70 0.75 0.91
Investment in equipment 4.23 4.23 4.23 0.77 0.76 0.86
Aggregate investment 3.96 3.88 4.23 0.80 0.83 0.89
Average labor productivity 1.07 0.84 0.65 0.67 0.99 0.99
Capitalists consumption 3.07 0.73 0.55 0.86 0.91 -0.14
Utilization 0.99 ... ... 0.92 ... ...
Skilled wage 0.73 0.89 0.89 0.16 0.72 0.70
Unskilled wage 1.31 0.82 0.59 0.13 0.72 0.64
Aggregate wage 1.13 0.82 0.66 0.12 0.71 0.64
Skill-premium 0.69 0.09 0.32 -0.08 0.53 0.79
Skilled labor hours 0.67 0.45 0.44 0.94 0.91 0.89
Unskilled labor hours 1.31 0.66 0.93 0.52 0.98 0.99
Aggregate labor hours 1.04 0.58 0.75 0.64 -0.85 0.99 
modely =
data
y
 jmodelA =0 0.18 0.04 0.03
The columns of the table correspond to the following cases: (1) model without capital-skill
complementarity, i.e  = ' = 1=3, (2) model with constant capital utilization, i.e Ut= 1 and
e(U t) = e.
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Table 5 - Statistical Moments: Models of di¤erent average relative labor
supply elasticities, and levels of the skill-premium
x x (%) corr (xt; yt)
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Output 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Aggregate consumption 1.20 1.19 1.15 1.07 1.35 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94
Investment in structures 4.36 4.36 4.36 4.36 4.36 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.82 0.48
Investment in eq. 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.87 0.49
Aggregate invesment. 4.04 4.05 3.99 4.18 3.43 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.87 0.60
Labor productivity 1.09 1.07 0.80 0.82 1.28 0.53 0.72 0.53 0.44 0.88
Capitalists consumption 3.05 3.02 2.48 3.12 3.09 0.74 0.89 0.81 0.92 0.81
Capital utilization 0.88 0.86 0.80 0.86 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.93
Skilled wage 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.79 0.94 0.24 0.22 0.07 -0.31 0.67
Unskilled wage 1.27 1.24 0.98 1.21 1.34 0.21 0.19 0.02 -0.29 0.61
Aggregate wage 1.17 1.16 1.00 1.11 1.24 0.21 0.18 -0.05 -0.32 0.64
Skill-premium 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.55 -0.11 -0.07 0.10 0.21 -0.35
Skilled hours 0.68 0.65 0.59 0.78 0.56 0.95 0.93 0.85 0.98 0.93
Unskilled hours 1.15 1.20 1.50 1.58 0.88 0.47 0.53 0.79 0.74 0.15
Aggregate hours 0.93 0.96 1.18 1.27 0.67 0.62 0.64 0.81 0.81 0.40 
modely =
data
y
 jmodelA =0 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.19
The columns of the table correspond to the following cases: (3) u;w=s;w= 0.65 and ws=wu=
1.75, (4) u;w=s;w= 1.60 and ws=wu= 1.75 and (5) u;w=s;w= 60 and ws=wu= 1.75, (6) ws=wu=
1.60 and u;w=s;w= 1:0857, (7) ws=wu= 1.85 and u;w=s;w= 1:0857.
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Figure 1 - IRFs of wages , skill-premium, labor hours, and relative hours to a Harrod-neutral
shock ( ) and an investment-specic shock (- -) in the benchmark model
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Figure 2 - IRFs of aggregate variables to a Harrod-neutral shock ( ) and an investment-specic
shock (- -) in the benchmark model
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Figure 3 - Surface plots of steady state relative elasticity of unskilled labour supply (u;w=s;w)
3a - s2 [0:3; 0:9] and
u2 [0:01; 0:5]
3b - s2 [0:3; 0:9] and
u2 [0:01; 0:9]
3c - s 2 [0:01; 0:9] and
u 2 [0:01; 0:9]
Figure 4 - IRFs of wages , skill-premium, labor hours, and relative hours to a Harrod-neutral
shock ( ) and an investment-specic shock (- -) in the model with constant capital utilization
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Figure 5 - IRFs of aggregate variables to a Harrod-neutral shock ( ) and an investment-specic
shock (- -) in the model with constant capital utilization
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Figure 6 - IRFs of the capital-skill ratio () vs relative hours (- -). 1st row: benchmark model.
2nd row: model with constant capital utilization.1st column: A-shock. 2nd column: Z-shock
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Figure 7 - Auto-correlogram, of macroeconomic aggregates from the benchmark model (- -) and
US data ( )
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